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Abstract
This paper establishes a parallel between Max Weber's bureaucratic and traditional
forms of domination, on the one hand, and the distinction between Western and
Japanese management, on the other. Just as bureaucracy, so Western management
theory andpracticehavebeenfundamentally guidedbyZweckrationalitiit,oftencalled
instrumental rationality; andjustas the traditional organization, soJapanese manage-
mentis quickenedbythekinship spirit. The parallel ceases, however, wherethispaper
maintains that the traditional (kinship) organization is both rational and modern, or
'modernizable', without having to mutate into Weber's impersonal bureaucracy.
Weber'sinstrumental-rationalismreducedthe ideal-typeofthetraditionalorganization
to a residual, counter-concept ofthe bureaucracy and the bureaucracy, in its turn, to a
dehumanized 'thing'. In the current scene, despite clear and express efforts at
overcoming the admitted inadequacies of the bureaucratic mind-set, Western mana-
gement theory andpractice seem unable to escape the grip ofinstrumental rationality.
Eventhough theeffortsatmovingawayfromthebureaucracyareeffortsatbeingmore
'traditional', the debunking language against the 'traditional' continues. There is a
needto supplementthecritiqueofinstrumentalrationalitythatis currentlytakingplace
in some quarters with a positive reconstruction ofthe traditional (kinship) organiza-
tion. The two-pronged approach may open up more management and organization
alternatives on the micro-level ofthe modem business firm which is the immediate
concern ofthis paper. Th.ere are signs that the need is beginning to be felt and, more
importantly, to be addressed.
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fully in the author's book Oikos: the Two Faces o/Organization.Harvard professor, John Kotter, discussing the subject of leadership in a video
presentation where he distinguishes the leader from the manager, relates an old story
showing how workers may view their work in different ways. Abricklayer, on being
asked what he is doing, may answer that he is laying and securing bricks one on top
ofthe other. Another worker may say that he is building a wall. But a third worker
with a broader vision may say that he is building a cathedral. Presumably, if we take
the example in context, the model attitude ofthe third worker requires leadership, for
in Kotter's view it is the leader who gives vision, this being one ofthe distinguishing
marks ofa leader which separate him from a mere manager.
Ifwe look at it more closely, Kotter's example is an unwitting comment on Masaaki
Imai's popularbook, Kaizen. For we might say thatthe first worker, the most myopic
ofthe three, may be described as aprocess-oriented worker (the Japanese orientation,
according to Imai). The second worker, not as short-sighted as the first, may be
described as a results-oriented worker (the Western orientation, according to Imai).
BULthe third worker, number one in the professor's book, turns outto be none and all
ofthe above, and a visionary to boot.
-
This leads us to suspect that boththe Japanese and the American couldbe missing the
heart of the matter. The difference between Japanese and Western management as
explained by Kaizen may tum out to be perhaps accurate and insightful but not
fundamental enough. And there may be more to the third worker's view ofwork than
what our American author suspects.
The clue to the matter lies, in my opinion, in the example itself. The favored worker
attitude is craftsmanship said to have been typical of European Middle Ages. And
thereby hangs a tale. For in this traditional society, the example ofmotivated work
was the consequencenotofany specific leadershipbutofa way oflife. Not leadership
but culture was generally the source of "visionary" work during a period when work
was a vocation rather than a mere function or livelihood.
Such a clue will lead us to a betterunderstanding ofKaizen than that offered by ImaL
For Kaizen, as described by Imai, is the mother technique, or umbrella as he puts it,
of all Japanese techniques (QCs, JIT, TQM, etc.). But as technique, Kaizen itself is
consequence rather than cause. And the fundamental culture ofwhich Kaizen is but
one consequence is not specifically Japanese. It is not even specifically Confucian,
which is a major influence of Japanese culture. It is simply traditional culture of
fundamentally the same kind that produced Middle Age craftsmanship.
This becomes even more plausible if we remember that feudal Japan was directly
forced into modernizing without undergoing any transition of the kind that Europe
underwent. The Meiji slogan 'Western technology, Japanese spirit' aptly expressed
the nature ofJapan'smodernization. Thepurpose oflearning Western technologywas
expressed in still another Meiji slogan, 'strong army, rich nation', obviously one of
the lessons learned by Japan whose ports were forced open by the strong and richnations ofthe West. !fthelattersloganmay describe JapanofWorld War II, the former
slogan may describe postwarJapan when the Samurai turned businessman.
The Question ofUniversal Management Principles
Western tradition has historically been wont to contrast itselfover against the 'Orien-
tal'. Itis not merely that vague feeling ofsuperiority common to human associations
which consider outsiders as less fortunate and therefore inferior. As the ancient
Greeks, so·the modern West has perceived the difference to lie in something quite
specific: its rationality. Therein, it has believed, lies the difference between East and
West. This rationality, this 'clarityofthought',was whatthe Enlightenmentcelebrated
in contrast to the 'dark' Middle Ages. Is not man, after all, defined as the rational
animal? Rationality must be the attribute not of this or that man but of everyman.
Western culture is notjustany culture. Insofar as it based on 'scientific' rationality, it
is the universal culture. In this it has distinguished itself over against all traditional
cultures. As an Americanauthorputit: "Cultural relativism succeeds indestroying the
West's universal or intellectually imperialistic claims, leaving it to be just another
culture" (Bloom, p. 39).
Lately,however,therehasbeenalotoftalkabout'Asian'managementas distinguished
from 'Western'management. Whatis itthatthe Asianexperienceaddsto management
theory that was not already in the Western experience? Must management be either
Asian orWestern? Whathappens then to universal management principles?
Some lightmaybe shedonthis never-ending debate by the strategizing process. Take
the 'vision'. Ithas become the norm to begin strategy formulations ofthe firm with
the corporate vision. Its usefulness can be gauged by its wide use. The function of
'visioning' is to spell out where the company wants to be in the future. The clearer
thevision,theclearerthe mission. Theclearerthe mission, theeasierto setmeasurable
objectives. So focused, the company can prioritize and optimize the economics of
fmite effort and limited resources.
The Problem ofRationality
There is, however, aninherentproblematic inthis conceptofvision. Itemergedrather
unexpectedlyduringaninformalbreakfastdialoguebetweenadistinguishedAmerican
professorand·authorofmanymanagementbooks, Warren Bennis, and some guests of
the Asian Institute ofManagement. The occasion was the Institute's 25th anniversary
celebrationinManilainFebruary 1993.Bennisspokeaboutleadershipandsaidamong
otherthings thattrue leadershadvision. Duringthe openforum oneoftheparticipants
rathercasuallymadetheremarkthatHitler,too, hadavision.Therewas no appropriate
response given to the implied criticism ofthe virtues of 'visioning'.
2It was a rude reminder that 'vision' is an abstraction. As such it tells us nothing ofits
content. Instrategy formulation, vision names abstractly the beginning (which is also
the 'end' intended) in the process of strategizing. Similarly in the leader, it names
formally that which guides the exercise ofleadership. Inboth cases, the term 'vision'
is a purely formal concept. Strat~gizing and leadership can be conceptualized into a
'universal'rationalprocess applicable to any andevery situation, butonly ifitremains
on a purely formal and abstract level.
AHitler(oraTojo, for that matter) and a MotherTheresa mightconceivably learnand
apply correctly the same formal process ofvisioning. They might even learn about
the strategic relevance of Michael Porter's concept of 'value chain'. Nevertheless,
these students ofa 'universally' applicable rational process would end up, ifwe may
be allowed an understatement, doing different things. In someone's happy phraseo-
logy, they might all do the thing right butnot necessarily the right thing.
We mention in passing that this problematic is mainly responsible for the clamor for
ethics in management education. For the mostefficient way in a purely formal sense
may not necessarily be an ethical way. But ethics is not our concern here but the
question of 'Asian' and 'Western' ways ofmanaging which is merely another way of
putting the question ofuniversal management principles.
Once we introduce values in the discussion, the purely formal, 'universal', rational
process ofmanagementbecomesessentially incomplete_and problematical. Formally
speaking, strategy is the rationally correct use ofmeans to achieve chosenends. As a
purely formal process itapplies to any conceivable 'means' or 'ends'. It rationalizes
the activities ofthe firm so thatit may do things efficiently, so that it may do things
right. But as such it does not say whether it is the right thing to do.
Here is where'Asian' and 'Western' managements can go their separate ways, even
prescinding entirely from ethical issues. Since management is a mostpractical affair,
it will take place in a concrete context and situation. Theformal process is fleshed
out with concrete meanings and values and the comm~n tool can result in distinct
productions. Forthey candifferaboutwhatis the rightthing. 'Quality'inmanagement
is thus not merely'doing the thing right the first time', as it is now often said, for this
refers to efficiency: it is also doing the right thing.
Western and Asian Management
Let us illustrate. Firm (A) has certain goals to achieve. It may then decide quite
rationally that in the case of its workers it will only reward their 'performance', that
is, those activities that promote the firm's goals. Consequently, it will try to be 'lean
and mean' by continuously ridding itself of 'fat', that is, 'non-performers'. Having
chosen a goal, the most rational approach is to choose the most efficient means to
achieve the goal. That is called Zweckrationalitiit, goal or instrumental rationality.
3Itfollows that such 'traits'as 'seniority',should notbe rewarded as such. Forseniority
is notperfonnance. As such it does not contribute to the attainment ofthe finn's goal.
It would therefore be irrational, in this way ofthinking, to promotepeopleonthe basis
ofseniority. One can find this instrumental rationality in almost any Western book on
management. Clearly, finn (A) will differ in many essential ways from another finn
(B) which happens to reward seniority, not accidentally but systematically. If, in
addition, firm (B) believes in 'life-time employment' then we have an even wider
'cultural'gap betweenfirms (A) and (B). As far as firm (A) is concerned,firm (B) acts
'irrationally'. On the assumption that rational management is efficient management
and therefore should be more successful than an irrational one, then the success of
finn (B) would appear as a puzzle to finn (A). This may be why the West seems to
be so fascinated byJapanese management. Itsucceeds against 'allrhyme and reason'.
Now the authorofKaizen makes little ofthese 'irrational' practices ofJapanese finns
and prefers to focus on 'techniques' which, he seems to imply, are 'universal' and
transferable anywhere at will. But, in our opinion, these Japanese techniques have as
theirfoundationcertaincommonandsharedvalues, suchas reciprocal loyaltybetween
company and workers. They may appear transferable, since as techniques they are
described inbehavioral tenns. Butas Imaihimselfsays Kaizen is 'a way oflife', that
is, a culture. More accurately stated, Kaizen as technique is but an expression of a
way oflife. Its soul is culture.
From a purely fonnal pointofview, bothfirms (A) and (B) are rational. Forboth are
consistent with their understanding of the organization. They are both purposive,
using means as they understand their chosenends. The issue between East and West
in management theory is not aboutfonnal rationality. It is about values thatflesh out
theirrationalities. They differsystematically,as twodifferent systemsoforganization,
because they rank organizational values differently. In the end, goal-rationality is
determined by value-rationality.
There is then a real sense in which we can speak ofAsian and Western management,
or more accurately, of Asian and 'modem' Western management. The relevance of
"corporate culture' for understanding the dynamics of the firm is a relatively new
'discovery' in management theory. It is, in our opinion, the contribution of the
'traditional' to the 'modern' organization.
Bureaucracy and Clan
There is a clearparallel intended in the above difference between Western and Asian
management with the familiar contrast which Max Weber made between the 'bu-
reaucratic' and 'traditional' organizational ideal-types and also with his distinction
between goal-rationality (Zweckrationalitiit) and value-rationality (Wertrationalitiit).
4To Weber, Wertrationalitatis in the final analysis irrational andonly Zweckrationalitat
truly deserves to be called rational.
I have made use of these pairs of contrasting 'concepts' to reconstruct the newer
developments in Western management theory in my book Oikos: The Two Faces of
Organization (Silos 1991). The 'shifts' that are occurring in Western management
theory and practice are there described as attempts ofthe 'modem' organization (the
bureaucracy) to reclaim what it had previously rejected, the 'traditional' organization
(the clan), something implied in the 'shifts' although not necessarily admitted. The
literature generally speaking continues to use the same debunking language vis-a-vis
the traditional, although now whatis being debunkedas traditional is the bureaucracy.
Norbert Alterdescribes the European developmenttowards a new model oforganiza-
tion as a debureaucratism, detaylorisI11 and defordism, all these 'isms' being used
interchangeably. Alter writes about the 'new professionals' who are creating the new
organiz~tion.Rosabeth Moss Kanter announces the emergence ofthe 'innovative' in
contrast to the 'segmentalist' organizations, 'the old bureaucratic change-resisters'
(Kanter, 1985). Still, we observe that the newer developments, while trying to
overcome the negative consequences of the bureaucracy caiinot seem to escape the
grip of that which is mainly responsible for the unwanted consequences, namely,
instrumental, sometimes also called functional, ormore recently strategic, rationality.
Thus, they continue to be bureaucratic in this fundamental sense that Weber meantit.
DieBiirokratieist 'rationalen'Charakters: Regel, Zweck~Mittel,'sachliche'
Unpersonlichkeit beherrschen ihr Gebaren. Ihre Entstehung und Ausbrei-
tung hat daher iiberall in jenem besonderen, noch zu besprechenden Sinne
'revolutionar'gewirkt,wiedies derVormarschdes Rationalismusiiberhaupt
aufallen Gebieten zu tun pflegt. Sie vernichtete dabei Strukturformen der
Herrschaft, welche einen, in diesem speziellen Sinn, rationalen Charakter
nicht hatten (Weber, 578-579).
This abstract concept of the organization, very ap~ly expressed in the German term
Verdinglichung, is still at work in the new organization: for the organization remains
a 'thing' with its own goal. The result ofthis wayofunderstanding the organization is
thateverything in the organization, including its members, become mere instruments
for achieving its goal. Tha~ is Zweckrationalitiit, the 'special sense', that makes a
bureaucracy a bureaucracy. From it follows all the characteristics of the 'fully
developed' bureaucracy, including a certain 'dehumanization' which, Weber says, is
'welcome' to capitalism.
Die Biirokratie in ihrer Vollentwicklung steht in einem spezifischen Sinn
auch unter dem Prinzip des 'sine ira ac studio'. Ihre spezifische, dem
Kapitalismus willkommene, Eigenart entwickelt sie urn so vollkommener,
je mehr sie sich 'entmenschlicht', je vollkommener, hellit das hier, ihr die
spezifische Eigenschaft, welche ihr als Tugend nachgeriihmt wird: die
Ausschaltung von Liebe, HaB und allen rein personlichen, iiberhaupt allen
5irrationalen, derp Kalktil sichentziehenden,Empfindungselementenaus der
Erledigung der Amtsgeschafte, gelingt (Weber, 563).
What 'modem' (Western) culture demands is the 'professional' whom Weber rather
unambiguously describes as the "humanly uninvolved, therefore strictly 'objective'
professional." That is the ideal bureaucrat, impersonal, objective, calculating, strictly
determined by the goals ofthe organization.
Statt des durch personliche Anteilnahme, Gunst, Gnade, Dankbarkeit, be-
wegten Herrn deralteren Ordnungen verlangteben die modeme Kultur, flir
den auBeren Apparat, der sie sttitzt, je komplizierter und spezialisierter sie
wlrd, desto mehr den menschlich unbeteiligten, daher streng 'sachlichen'
Fachmann. Alles dies aber bietet die biirokratische Struktur in giinstiger
Verbindung (Weber, 563).
Therearecertainindicatorsthatthebureaucracystilldeterminesthe 'new'organization
despite the 'new professionals' mentioned by Alter. One such indicator is the reward
system, as we have pointed out. The ideal standard for continued employment, for
increases in salary or benefits, for promotions remains to be individualperformance,
which is defmed as the extent to which the work ofan individual employee achieves
or helps achieve organizational goals. Thus, while decrying the rules-orientation of
the bureaucracy and describing the new organization as more "person-centered", and
so evidencing a tum towards the more personal, traditional organization, Kanter goes
on to describe the 'new' innovative and integrative organization as "results-oriented,
rewarding outcomes" (Kanter, 1990, p. 353). This makes one wonder whether
Kanter's "person-centered" manageris any differentfrom Weber's "humanly uninvol-
ved, strictly objective professional."
Directly connected with this reward system is the motivational system which is
basically a self-motivation (the achievement motive!): the responsibility of proving
his skills and performance is all up to the individual employee. Taken together these
two systems add up to a message to the individual employee: it is all up to you, you
shapeuporyou ship out. There is nothingpersonalaboutit, ofcourse. Onthe contrary,
it is entirely impersonal, in complete accord with the 'virtue' of the bureaucracy.
Training,coaching,inspiring,motivating, are activities that depend onthe charismatic
manager or are situational repair jobs rather than the natural consequences of a
corporate culture.
Weber's Critique ofthe Traditional
The shortcoming ofWeber's reading ofthe traditional, why he was unable to give it
a more positive interpretation, was a rationalist bias which reduced the traditional to
aresidual concept. As he himselfexplains his 'interpretive'(verstehende) sociological
method, the adequacy of the meaning of a social action is proportionate to its
goal-rationality. Since there are social actions thatare not goal-rational, these mustbe
6explained as mere 'deviations' from reconstituted rational actions, that is, what they
would have been, had they been goal-rational.
Fur die typenbildende wissenschaftliche Betrachtung werden nun aIle irra-
tionalen, affektuell bedingten,Sinnzusammenhangedes Sichverhaltens,die
das Handeln beeinflussen, am ubersehbarsten als 'Ablenkungen'voneinem
konstruierten rein zweckrationalen Verlauf desselben erforscht und darge-
stellt. Z.B. wird bei einerErklarungeiner 'Borsenpanik'zweckmaBigerwei-
se.zunachst festgestellt: wie ohne Beeinflussung durch irrationale Affekte
das Handeln abgelaufen ware, und dann werden jene irrationalen Kompo-
nenten als 'StOrungen' eingetragen... Nurdadurch wird alsdann die kausale
Zurechnung von Abweichungen davon zu den sie bedingenden Irrationali-
mten rnoglich. Die Konstruktion eines streng zweckrationalen Handelns
also dientin diesen Fallen derSoziologie, seinerevidentenVerstandlichkeit
und seiner-- an derRationalitathaftenden -- Eindeutigkeitwegen, als Typus
fldealtypus'), urn das reale, durch Irrationalimten aller Art (Affekte, Irrtii-
mer) beeinfluBte Handeln als 'Abweichung' von dem bei rein rationalem
Verhalten zu gewmigenden Verlaufe zu verstehe~JWeber, 2-3).
For another, the traditional is understood by Weber in two senses, formally and
materially. Formally, it is defined as belief "an die Unverbruchlichkeit des immer so
Gewesenen as solchen," that is, belief in tradition simply because it is the tradition.
Materially, it is identified with the kinship system which is determined by personal
relationships. Formally defined, tradition is closed andstatic by definition and this is
often a critique levelled against the traditional. However, the kinship system cannotbe
said to be essentially static. Forthe kinship system as such can be dynamic and open,
for instance by the simple device ofextension, something Weber was well aware of
but did not think important for an assessment ofthe traditional, probably because he
was intent on contrasting modem Western culture overagainst it. The kinship system
by such an extension becomes potentially universalist when not restricted to blood
relationships and open to 'outsiders'. Secondly, it can become democratic (as the
consensual and participative practices in the Japanese firms demonstrate). Universa-
lism and democracy, two supposedly modem (and Western) characteristics are not
incompatible with the kinship system, as it is sometimes supposed.
Because Weber understood the kinship system as a mere deviation from the bu-
reaucracy, he failed to appreciate its positive organizational qualities. The kinship
system (here understood as extended and not limited to blood relationships) is not a
mere irrational deviationfrom the bureaucracybutstands onits ownright withits own
rationality. It differs essentially from the bureaucracy in that it is a concrete organiza-
tion ofthese people and not an abstract 'thing' made up offunctions to be filled up by
functionaries. If in the bureaucracy people are disembodied 'functions', therefore
entirely expendable and replaceable being purely instruments for the purposes ofthe
bureaucratic thing, the members ofthe extendedkinship are these concretepeople and
in this sense irreplaceable. In contrast to the bureaucratic abstraction, the concrete
kinship group is not a means but an end: it does not exist to work but works to exist.
7It is this understanding ofthe organization that distinguishes the family system from
the bureaucracy.
Instrumental rationality when turned into a philosophy is usually called 'positivism',
'behaviorism', 'scientism', among other names. We have already met above one
problem it creates as a philosophy: it relativizes all values. It is, as Weber would say,
value-free. Or as others would say, it is about "facts", about "what is" and not about
"what ought to be." Herbert Simon drew the conclusion on the authority of "logical
posit~vists" that therefore values and ethical propositions were beyond the purview of
science, for "there is no way in which the correctness ofethical propositions can be
empirically or rationally tested" (Simon, p. 46). Since Simon was writing about the
,'science' ofadministration, it followed that values were beyond its purview. However,
Weber's own description (above) ofthe method ofverstehende sociology implies that
it is, partially at least, counterfactual. It does not always explain real activity of real
peoplebutonly how people would actifthey were entirely goal-rational (ifthey were
not real people?). On this showing, it is not always about 'what is' but about what
'oughtto be',namely, goal-rational; therefore not as value-free as believednorpurely
descriptive but also prescriptive.
Significantly enough, positivist philosophy with its rationality, is undergoing rethin-
king and critique. In the German philosophical scene, names like Hans-Georg Ga-
damer, Jiirgen Habermas,Karl-Otto Apel come immediately to mind. Although these
philosophers do not entirely agree with each other and approach the problem not
entirely from the same perspective and interests, they all agree that instrumental
rationality is too narrow and requires correction and Western rationality needs 'recon-
struction'. But a broadening ofrationality inevitably re-establishes a link-up with the
tradItional that was severed by instrumental rationality. In this continuity, it is the
traditional that may tum out to be dynamic, rational and universalist and the U1sfru-






This leads to another observation. A unilinear development from kinship to modern
bureaucraticorganizationis ausual as~ilinption.Ithasbeenalmosteustoimirytoequate
humankinship relationships with primitive emotions andanimal impulses. The logic:
"if kinship, then primitive," seems to underpin many anthropological and social
studies. Even the Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft ofFerdinand Tonnies, which had a
positive view ofGemeinschaft, seemed to think in this manner. A common enough
argumentis thatGemeinschaftis simple,Gesellschaft is complex, and the simple must
give way to the more complex, as iftheir essence consisted in being either simple or
complex. Butifthe kinship systemassuchcanmodernize, this logic is as questionable
as the rationality that inspires it.
8On the micro level ofthe finn (which is ourconcern here), this should not be difficult
to comprehend. The Japanese firm as it is usually represented can be aptly described
as a modem traditional organization. One has only to match the comparative schema
ofHarvey Leibenstein with Weber's own distinction between the bureaucratic and the
traditional organizations to see a correspondence between Japanese practices and the
traditional on the one hand, and Western practices and the bureaucratic on the other.
JAPAN THEWEST
1. Firm recruits people ofparticul~r People recruited with ~icularskills ." ( ..
age andeducation. (orexperience) to till speciticjob.
2. Lifetime employmentideal. No lifetimeemployment ideal.
3. Company a community. Less emphasis on community ideal.
4. _No sharp distinction between Sharp distinction.
managers and workers.
5. Strong emphasis on gerneral Managem~ntpositions not
hierarchicalranks. standarized -- related to function.
6. Age andservice length explicitly Authority and responsibility
recognizedas a promotion'·criteria. ostensibly specitic.
7. Authorityandresponsibilty Authority~nd responsibilty
diffuse. ostensibly specitic.
8. Managerial authority limitedby Managerial authority challenged by





10. On-the-job trainingfor a variety On-the-job training for speciticjob.
ofjobs.
11. Job rotation andboundary Focus on specificjob with specific
jkxibiity. boundaries.
,
12. Emphasis on cooperation, Greater stress on individualistic
harmony, andconsensus. ' behavior within bounds ofnarrow
.. job definitionsand commitments•
13. Bonus system. No regular bonus system_
Source: Harvey Leibenstein, Inside the Firm.
Ourown schema shows the different cultural roots ofthese two types oforganization.
It can serve to explain how management techniques may appear the same and yet be
different,accordingto the dictumattributed to T. Fujisawa,cofounderofHondaMotor
Corporation: "Japanese and Americanmanagementis 95 percentthe same, anddiffers






















It should therefore be ofno surprise that more recent discussions are again addressing
the relevance ofthe traditional (although the term is seldom used and the bias seems
to remain) and significantly, often in the context ofquestions about 'community' and
'ethics.' Reading some of the titles of articles recently (1993) compiled into a book
GemeinschaftundGerechtigkeitis sufficient to prove the point (with contributions by
well-known authors such as Karl-Otto Apel). One ofthe headings reads: "Streit urn
den Streit: Gemeinschaft oder Gesellschaft." Some ofthe titles: "Gemeinschaft and
Demokratie in den USA", "Die Modernitat der 'Gemeinschaft"'; "Posttraditionale
Gemeinschaften" and so on along this vein. There is an apparent search for more
adequateandmoreintegrativeconceptsand terminologyto replacethemorerestrictive
ones.
10As the 'new' organizations try overcome the negative consequences of instrumental
rationalitythey are willy-nillyreclaiming themorepersonalcharacterofthetraditional
organization. AHarvardmanagementcasebook(BeeretAI.)evensuggestscombining
the bureaucracy and the clan, based on William Ouchi's "Markets, Bureaucracies and
Clans".1 However, amere'combination' as proposed wrongly assumes, Isuggest, that
'bureaucracy' and 'clan' stand for mere situational behavior so that management can
switch from one to the other as conditions demand, as in the 'contingency theory',
sometimes referred to as the 'itdepends'theory. Butbureaucracy and clanstand rather
for contrasting options that are systemic and cultural, therefore essentially long-term
and enduring, rather than merely behavioral or situational.
Another sign of this tum to the traditional is the current vogue of distinguishing the
leaderfrom the manager, as in John Kotter's bookon leadership. Butas I have pointed
out in my review ofthe book (Silos, 1992a), it is a bureaucratic idea ofthe manager
that allows Kotter to distinguish the leaderfrom the manager. Forinstance, motivating
people, according to Kotter, is a distinctive characteristic of a leader and not of a
manager. That would be a purely gratuitous assertion unless it was made within a
bureaucratic context where the managermerely 'administers' the work ofemployees
who are expected to be self-motivated. With such a concept of a manager, which
incidentally fits exactly Weber's idea ofa bureaucrat, it is not surprising that Kotter
finds it necessary to supplement it with the idea ofa leader. Leadership is an integral
partofmanaging. Kotter's solution, whichmaybedescribedas charismatic ratherthan
systemic, is a provisional solution at best. It has a parallel in the 'human relations
movement', which depends on the personal efforts ofthe manager at human relations
while leaving the system as impersonal as ever. In short, although Kotter expressly
decries instrumental rationality, he fails to recognize its systemic dimensions.
Again Alter's description of the new organIzation also suggests the traditional tum.
Besides being constituted by the "nouveauxprofessionnels," it is also described as the
"retour de l'artisanat," presumably the return of such artisans as in the previous
example who think not in terms ofbricklaying or walls butofcathedrals. Butan even
more directreference to the traditional is contained in the-bookForthe Common Good
ofH.E. Daly H.E.and J. B. Cobb Jr., an economist and a theologian, as I understand.
Their message is quite apropos to ourdiscussion.
Ourhope is to moveforward to anew type ofeconomydifferentfrom either
capitalism or socialism as they have been understood in the past. But for
those who still find it difficult to think ofan economy that does not fit on
this spectrum, we suggest that they consider feudalism. Feudalism, surely,
is neithercapitalist nor socialist, yet itendured longer in Europe than either
ofthese is likely to do. Feudalism is the bete noirofboth, and that will help
to indicate how one can be opposed to both (Daly and Cobb. p. 15, fn. 6).
1The use otthe term'clan'inthiscontextseems tohavebeenoriginally suggestedbyFrancis Hsuinthe book
Clan, Class andClub. which distinguishes respectively Chinese. Indian and Americansocial psychologies.
11The authors expressly deny that their intention is "to call for a return to feudalism."
But they do believe "that surveying a wider range ofeconomic systems can open our
eyes to new possibilities. Ofthese, feudalism is worthy ofcareful consideration." The
pointthatdirectlyconcerns us is the reasonwhy theythinkfeudalismdeservesasecond
look.
The feudal system was more communitarian than either socialism or capi-
talism in both theory and practice. It has been badly maligned since the
f:nlightenment by those whose interest required the extirpation of the
continuing power ofcommunity in human life.
finally, we note that the social market economy ofpostwarGermany clearly wished
to avoid the 'dehumanizing'consequences ofan impersonal economic system. "[Wal-
ter] Eucken's point of departure was his frequent question: 'How can the modem
industrialized economy and society be organised in a way that is both humane and
efficient?' His concept of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft, or Responsible Free Market
Economy, was evolved in answer" (Hennessy). For "the market can only distribute
incomes commensurate withperformance" and that only when the market is working
smoothly; "itcannottakehumanand socialaspects into account. Similarissues cannot
be tackled by the market, they have to be dealt with through an adequately devised
social policy" (Jung, p. 19, italics added).
Inconclusionone maysay thatclearlysome 'shift'is takingplace, notonly in business
management but simultaneously in other spheres oftheory and practice and the shift
seems to revolve around the problems ofrationality and values in Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft. In more micro-organizational terms, it seems to revolve around the
problems ofthe bureaucracy and the clan.
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